Akinsulure Semilore anor V LSS President & Ors

IN THE STUDENTS’ JUDICIAL COUNCIL,

ADEKUNLE AJASIN UNIVERSITY,

HOLDEN AT AKUNGBA-AKOKO

Suit No: SJC/B/005

Motion No: 01

SEMILOORE AKINSULURE                                            APPLICANT

OLUSEYI AJAYI

AND

PRESIDENT, LAW STUDENTS’ SOCIETY

ELECTED LSS BOJ MEMBERS

ADEUSI ELIZABETH

ADEJUTE OLUWATOMISIN                                                RESPONDENTS

AJIDAGBA MOSADOLUWA

ODOGUN OMOLOLU

LSS ELECTORAL COMMITTEE

LAW STUDENTS’ REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL

Before their Lordships:

Honourable Justice Elebute Aanuoluwapo Peter (Presiding Judge)

Honourable Justice Akinremi Samuel

Honourable Justice Alli Rhoda Banke

Honourable Justice Arogbokun Femi

Honourable Justice Bankole Samuel Oluwapelumi

JUDGMENT

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This is a Unanimous decision of this honourable court as this Judgment is the decision of the judges who sat on this matter named above, although this is alien to the SJC rules of court as it is silent on a Judge coming to read a judgement alone, it is not alien to our extant law and practice in the legal jurisprudence of Nigeria. In ATTORNEY GENERAL, IMO STATE VS ATTORNEY GENERAL RIVERS STATE where Fatayi Williams in interpreting section 294(2) observed that:

” In view of the interpretation which I have put on the phrase ” may be pronounced “, i also hold that any of the justices of the supreme court who heard any matter can, after a decision has been arrived at by all the justices, pronounce the opinion of another just who, for one reason or another, is unable to reduce his opinion into writing or be present when the judgement in the case is being delivered by each of the other justice”.

is it necessary for all the justices who partake during the hearing of the matter to be present when judgement will be delivered? In other words, must the quorum be formed again when judgement need to be delivered?

In a bid to answer these questions, the provision of section 294(2) of 1999 constitution will be examine. The section provides thus:

” Each justice of the supreme court or of the court of appeal shall express and deliver his opinion in writing, or may state in writing that he adopts the opinion of another justice who delivers a written opinion”.

From the wordings of the section cited above, one will see that each justice of the supreme court or court of appeal is expected to express his opinion in writing. By this, it won’t be difficult to know the opinion of the remaining justices even if they were not present during the day of judgement. But then, can their opinion be pronounce by a single justice? The same section had answer this in the next sentence where it was provide that: ” or may state in writing that he adopts the opinion of another justice who delivers a written opinion”. By this, it shows that a single justice of the supreme court or the court of appeal can adopt and pronounce the written opinion of other justices even if they are absent. Therefore, it’s not necessary for all justices who heard a matter to be present when judgement is delivered.

This suit was commenced in this Honourable Court by way of an originating summons dated 18th day of January 2024 and filed on the 19th day of January 2024, a written address in support of the originating summon was filed alongside, a 9 paragraphs affidavit dated on 18th day of January 2024.  The 1st and 4th respondent responded by filing a motion on notice dated 1st day of February 2024 and filed on the 2nd of February 2024 praying the court for an order setting aside the whole step taken by the 1st and 2nd Applicants in this suit by striking out both the originating summons dated 19/01/2024, the affidavit in support of the originating summons date 19/01/2024 and the written address in support of the originating summon dated 26/01/2024 against the 1st and 4th Applicants which withdrawn by the counsel. The 1st raised a preliminary objection as to the appearance of the counsel to the applicant which was overruled on the ground that the counsel deposing to an affidavit does not imply that he can’t be the counsel on the matter. The applicant raised an objection as to the appearance of the counsel to the 4th respondent being the attorney general of the Law student’s society, the court upheld his argument and held that the attorney general cannot appear for another party who is not a member of the SEC. the counsel to the 4th respondent argued that the Class rep who is the 4th respondent is a member of the SEC, his argument was dismissed and that of the applicant was upheld. The first respondent stated that he has no response to the Originating summon and added omnibus prayer to that of the applicant.

This is the ruling of the court to the Originating Motion dated and filed on the 18th day of January 2024 and filed on the 19th day of January 2024 brought pursuant to ORDER 2, RULE 5 OF THE STUDENT JUDICIAL COUNCIL (CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES 2021) AND UNDER THE INHERENT JURISDICTION OF THE HONOURABLE COURT in the above named suit where in the applicant by way of Originating summon seek for the determination of the following questions:

  1. WHETHER OR NOT THE LSS ELECTORAL COMMITTEE HAS FAILED IN HER OBLIGATIONS TO CONDUCT ELECTIONS OF CLASS REPRESENTATIVES AS MANDATED BY THE LSS CONSTITUTION
  2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVES HAVE THE POWER TO CONDUCT ELECTION FOR THE MEMBERSHIP POSITION OF THE BODY OF JUSTICES

and as a consequence, an order of this honorable court declaring:

  1. THAT THE LSS ELECTORAL COMMITTEE HAS FAILED IN HER OBLIGATIONS TO CONDUCT ELECTIONS OF CLASS REPRESENTATIVES AS MANDATED BY THE LSS CONSTITUTION
  2. A DECLARATION THAT DUE TO THE FAILURE OF THE LSS ELECTORAL COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT THE ELECTIONS OF CLASS REPRESENTATIVES, THE 3RD TO 5TH RESPONDENTS LACKS THE POWER TO CONDUCT ELECTION FOR THE MEMBERSHIP POSITION OF THE BODY OF JUSTICES
  3. A DECLARATION THAT THE 3RD TO 6TH RESPONDENTS SHOULD STOP IMPERSONATING AS CLASS REPRESENTATIVE HAVING DEFAULT ON THE STRENTH OF LEGITIMACY.

The First respondent added the following Omnibus prayer:

  1. An order declaring that the 3rd to 5th respondents are not validly elected class representative and lacks the constitutional power to conduct election for aspiring members of the BOJ.
  2. An Order declaring the election of the 2nd respondents null and void
  3. That the LSRC, 8th respondents lacks the constitutional power to ratify members of the BOJ
  4. An Order mandating the 7th respondent to screen and guide the Class rep in conducting the election into the BOJ positions across all levels

2.0 ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION:

The issues which has been formulated before this Honorable Court are:

  1. WHETHER OR NOT THE LSS ELECTORAL COMMITTEE HAS FAILED IN HER OBLIGATIONS TO CONDUCT ELECTIONS OF CLASS REPRESENTATIVES AS MANDATED BY THE LSS CONSTITUTION
  2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVES HAVE THE POWER TO CONDUCT ELECTION FOR THE MEMBERSHIP POSITION OF THE BODY OF JUSTICES

3.0 LEGAL ARGUMENT

The Counsel for the applicant in arguing the first issue for determination argues that the issue bordered on the legality of the class representative within the jurisdiction of the law students society, that the class rep has assumed office without being validly elected by the appropriate body in accordance with Section 43 (1)(2)(3) of the Law Students’ society (LSS) constitution which states that;

43(1) there shall be for the 200L – 500L class representative, who shall be elected not later than fourth week of every semester.

(2) the election shall be conducted by the electoral committee and the method of voting shall be at the discretion of the committee

(3) the elected officers shall have their names made known to the public by the committee

The counsel to the applicant further argued that the above provision is clear and unambiguous and any attempt to deviate from it will amount to flagrant violation of the Constitution supported by the case of EIMSKIP LTD V EXQUISITE INDUSTRIES (NIG) LTD (2003 1 SCNJ. 317 where my learned brother Mohammed JSC stated that; “where there is a fundamental failure to comply with the requirement of a statute, the issue is not irregularity, but a nullity”.

The counsel further stated that the Constitution of the Law Students’ Society is the fons et origo and a guiding light which should be the guiding principle and the measuring barometer in which all statutes are measured in the society therefore everything that happens in the Law students society must be governed by the Constitution, Counsel cited the case of A.G OF BENDEL STATE V A.G OF THE FEDERATION & ORS (1981) 12 NSCC 314 at P. 395 Lines 4 -223.

Counsel to the applicant added that the 7th respondent has failed to perform its constitutional Duty by not conducting any election upon which the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th respondent can derived legitimacy of being class representative and they have been parading themselves as such.

The Counsel therefore submitted that the electoral committee has erred in law by not conducting election into the position of the class representatives and prayed the court to hold same in favor of the applicants.

The applicant in arguing the second issue for determination argues that the class representatives does not have such powers to conduct the Body of Justice’s election, applicant relied on section 33 (10) of the LSS constitutions 2020 which states thus:

The members of the BOJ shall be elected by members of their various classes after which their name shall be forwarded by the class representatives to the LSRC not later than the second sitting of the LSRC.

Counsel stated that unlike interpretation of statute, the interpretation of the constitution has its own guiding principle citing the case of FRN v NGANJIWA SC/794/2019 where the Supreme court reviewed decided cases on interpretation of constitution and outlined these guiding principles:

  1. In interpreting the constitution, which Is the supreme law of the land, mere technical rules of interpretation of the statutes must be avoided, so as not to defeat the principles of government enshrined therein. Hence, a broader interpretation should be preferred, unless there is something in text or in the rest of the constitution to indicate that a narrower interpretation will best carry out the objects and purpose of the constitution.
  2. All sections of the constitution are to be construed together and not in isolation.
  3. Where the words are clear and unambiguous, a literal interpretation would be resorted to in order to applied, thus according to the words of their plain and grammatical meanings.
  4. Where there is ambiguity in any section, a holistic interpretation would be resorted to in order to arrive at the intention of the framers.
  5. Since the draftsperson is not known to be extravagant with words of provision, every section should be construed in such a manner as not to render other sections redundant or superfluous.
  6. The proper approach to the construction of the constitution should be one of liberalism and it is improper to construe any of the provisions of the constitution as to defeat the obvious ends which the constitution was to achieve.

 He further argued that it is important to note that by virtue of S. 33 (10) of the LSS constitution 2020, the class representative are not qualified to conduct election as it would be contradicting the intention of the draftsmen (law makers). He added that the constitution empowers the class and not the class representative the power to conduct election of the body of Justices and that the duty of the class representative in this instance is to oversee the electioneering process and not be the electoral Umpire.

RATIO

I shall now turn my eyes to decide on the arguments that have been canvassed in support as there is none against this application. These arguments will be examined under different heads as canvassed by the parties namely:

  1. Whether the Applicant can depose to an affidavit and still be the counsel in the suit

The argument of the counsel to the first respondent while raising his preliminary objection is not valid. In this instance case where the applicant has deposed to an affidavit, he can proceed to being a counsel as he will be the one to face the shame of being docked in the witness box if he is to give any testimony in court. As rightly argued by the Applicant in the case of Bala v. Dikko [2013] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1343) 52 at 60 para – G-H, per Mohammed, JSC: The proper thing to do is to use the litigant (or duly authorized representative) as deponent or other staff in counsel’s office such as a litigation officer seized with the facts of the case.

Having said that, an affidavit deposed to by Counsel on behalf of his client cannot ipso facto be declared invalid. By being a deponent, Counsel only makes himself prone to enter the witness box and act as witness to his client in the event where the Court seeks oral evidence in support of the affidavit. This is precisely where the impropriety of such practice is exposed.

In addition, in Nwite v PDP (2023) 7 NWLR Pt. 1883) 357 his lordship, Garba JSC (who read the leading judgment) analysed the provisions of the Evidence Act vis-à-vis the provisions of Rule 20(1), (4), and (6) of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners (RPC) that his lordship Eko JSC had relied on in the Akinlade and Owners of MT Marigold cases and came to the following conclusion at pages 31-32 of the law report:

“… the Rules [RPC] do not render evidence given or deposed to by a legal practitioner in a client’s case in which he appears as counsel, inadmissible in evidence in the proceedings of Court, they render such legal practitioner liable for unprofessional conduct in contravention of the Rules and other appropriate penalties to be imposed by the court before which the contravention or breach occurs. See also, Akinlade v. INEC & Ors (2020) 7NWLR (PT. 1754)

The Court decided that the counsel to the applicant can proceed to being the counsel in this case and maintain such.

  1. Whether the 4th respondent can be represented by the Attorney General of the Law Student Society in his capacity as the class representative.

As rightly canvassed by the Counsel for the applicant, the Attorney General is constitutionally limited to represent the Student executive council in any legal proceeding in relation to their office within the council and not for personal benefit. This is the position of the Law students’ Society Constitution 2020 in Section 10 (1) of it which states thus: He shall be the chief law officer of the society and shall represent the society, the SEC or any of the SEC members in all legal disputes. This provision of the constitution should not be violated like a virgin on Honeymoon. The court holds same against the Counsel for the 4th respondent and he is hereby discharged from representing the 4th Defendant in this case.

  1. Whether or not the LSS Electoral committee has failed in her obligations to conduct elections of class representatives as mandated by the LSS Constitution

I shall now focus on the Substance of the matter brought before this honorable court, The Applicant canvassed in his written address the argument that in accordance with Section 43 (1)(2)(3) which states:

  1. There shall be for the 200L – 500L, class representatives who shall be elected not later than the fourth week of every first semester
  2. The election shall be conducted by the electoral committee and the method of voting shall be at the discretion of the committee
  3. The elected officers shall have their names made public by the committee

Flowing from the above and as posited in the case of EIMSKIP LTD V EXQUISITE INDUSTRIES NIG LTD. (2003) 1 SCNJ. 317, where there is a failure to comply with the requirement of a statute the issue is not of irregularity but a nullity hence we uphold the brief of argument of the applicant that the 7th Defendant has breached the provision of the section 43 (1)(2)(3) of constitution of the Law Students’ constitution the way Bayern Munich breached the defence of Barcelona in the UEFA Champions league in 2020.

  1. The class representatives have the power to conduct election for the membership position of the Body of Justices.

To this salient point I shall now turn my eyes, the Applicant argued that the Constitution of the Law Students’ Society 2020 in Section 33 sub 10 of it states that “The members of the BOJ shall be elected by members of their various classes after which their names shall be forwarded by the class representatives to the LSRC not later than the second sitting of the LSRC”

Extreme care is usually taken by lawmakers in the drafting of law in order to structure their words to cover as many loopholes as possible and be void of ambiguity. But lawmakers remain human and so it is almost impossible for them to be perfect. Words often have multiple meanings and people would always try to interpret words in ways which best suit their purposes. It is the function of the judiciary to determine the true intention of the lawmakers from the words used. This is why no random person can interpret the laws, as there are rules followed by members of the judiciary in the interpretation of statutes. This privilege granted to the courts to interpret laws does not give the courts the authority to rewrite the laws. The court is merely to make the law read in the way it thinks proper. This view was stated by Bairamian, J.S.C., in Okumagba v. Egbe when he said that the office of the judge is jus dicere, not jus dare- to state the law and not to give it. However, the court may correct a law when there is very obviously a mistake as stated by the Supreme Court in Yusufu v. Obasanjo, R. v. Eze and Ejor v. Inspector-General of Police.

The major common law principles which guide the courts in the interpretation of statutes are something like canons of interpretation. However, these rules are not absolute. It happens often that while one principle supports one perspective of interpretation, another principle would support an opposing interpretation. The major common law rules that shall be observed are the literal rule, the golden rule, the mischief rule and the ejusdem generis rule.

 

The literal rule.

The literal rule prescribes that words should be given their ordinary meaning when statutes are being interpreted. It is believed that the ordinary meanings of words contain the true intention of the legislature. This view was supported by Tridal, C.J. in the Sussex Peerage Case. It is believed that the mere inconvenience of words when applied in their ordinary sense is not enough to depart from the ordinary meanings of the words. This view was shown in the cases of Adegbenro v. Akintola and Okumagba v. Egbe. The harshness of the rule was shown in the case of R. v. Bangaza where the defendants faced capital punishment for an offence committed while they were infants because they were not infants anymore when they were convicted.

The golden rule.

Where the application of the original meaning of the words used in the statute would create absurdity, inconsistency or ambiguity, the courts may choose to apply the secondary meaning of the words used. The assumption is that lawmakers do not intend anything that is absurd. The rule was formulated in Becke v. Smith where Parke, B., stated that it is important the give words their ordinary meaning when interpreting statutes, but the words may be modified if the ordinary meaning leads to absurdity. The words should only be modified as much as is required to remove the absurdity, and no further. The kind of absurdity that is referred to is when it would be illogical, either because the statute contradicts itself or it contradicts a principle in law. A statute cannot be said to create absurdity in its literal translation simply because it is inconvenient for one of the parties.

In Re Singsworth, a son who had murdered his mother was exempted from inheriting the deceased’s estate to prevent him from benefiting from his crime. In R. v. Eze, the court construed “or” as “and” to make sense of the definition of an indictable offence. This interpretation was adopted by the Supreme Court in Ejor v. Inspector-General of Police and given legislative endorsement through a subsequent amendment of the section.

Mischief rule.

The mischief rule was laid down in Heydon’s case. In the application of this rule, the intention of the judiciary is used to interpret a statute and not just the written words. In doing this, it is important for the court to consider the state of affairs before the law was made and the ill in the society which the law was made be correct. The court is then to interpret the law in line with such. It is known as the mischief rule because the court is to interpret the law in such a way that it applies to the mischief it was made to correct. In finding the intention of the legislature, the court may consult the preamble of the statute and other extrinsic sources. For example, if a law is made against littering in classes to improve cleanliness in the faculty and X litters right outside a classroom, the law may be interpreted to extend to outside the classrooms to suit the purpose for which the law was created. This rule was employed by courts in Smith v. Hughes and Akerele v. Inspector-General of Police.

The mischief rule may also be used to prevent a law made for one purpose from being used for another purpose. In Gorris v. Scott, a statutory order required that animals on board a ship be kept in pens of a specified size. The defendant violated the rule which caused the plaintiff’s sheep to get washed overboard during a storm. The plaintiff sued for breach of a statutory duty. The court gave its decision in favour of the defendant since the rule was made to prevent the spreading of diseases and not to prevent the washing of animals overboard. It was held that the law should be applied to the mischief for which it was created.

Where the words of the statute are clear, the rule may be used to expand or restrict the interpretation. In Corkery v. Carpentar, a bicycle was interpreted to be a “carriage” in the interpretation of a statute and in Kruchlak v. Kruchlak, a married woman with no husband to support her was treated as a single woman for the purpose of affiliation proceedings while in Wiltshire v. Barette, the power to arrest a person committing an offence was interpreted broadly to include persons apparently committing a crime.

The Ejusdem Generis Rule.

This rule proffers that when general words come after particular words, the general words should be interpreted in line with the particular words. In Nasr v. Bouari, the court was to interpret section 1(1) of the Rent Control Act 1965 which defines premises as a building of any description occupied or used by persons for living or sleeping or other lawful purposes. The court was to decide whether the section included use for a nightclub in its definition of premises. The court held that nightclub was not included as “other lawful purposes” refers to purposes similar to living and sleeping. In R. v. Payne, a crowbar was included in the interpretation of a statute under which it was an offence to convey into prison with the intent to facilitate the escape of any prisoner, any mask, dress or other disguise, or any letter, or any other article or thing.

Flowing from the above the Correct instrument for interpretation in this instant case is the Golden rule which and does gives room for secondary interpretation of the words of the constitution. Thus, the Class representatives has not been clothed with the power to conduct the election but to only forward the names of BOJ members of their classes to the LSRC. This now begs the question of who can conduct the BOJ election, section 33 sub 10 of the LSS Constitution 2020 has provided who can vote for the BOJ members but not who is qualified to contest or who can oversee the process of electing BOJ members.

On if the class representative can conduct election, Since the class is to vote for their candidate, it is the position of this honorable court that members of the class must also be responsible for overseeing this process by setting up a committee for themselves which will be headed by the class representative and the committee will screen and conduct election of aspirants into the BOJ as laid down in the tenets of the LSS constitution 2020. The committee member shall come by the way of nomination by the class members and as decided by the class members.

On if the LSRC can ratify the BOJ, this honorable court upholds the argument of Applicant that the LSRC has not been clothed with the power to ratify and as such does not have the power to ratify. Sec 33(10) of the LSS Constitution 2020 has only stipulated that the names of Elected BOJ members is to be forwarded to the LSRC, more like informing the LSRC of their position and this scope shouldn’t be exceeded.

CONCLUSION

Having upheld some of the grounds upon which this suit was filed, this honorable court hereby Unanimously grant the following orders:

  1. That due to the failure of the LSS electoral committee to conduct the elections of class representatives, the 3rd to 5th respondents lacks the power to conduct election for the membership position of the body of justices.
  2. That the 3rd to 6th respondents is not validly elected class representative for the 2023/2024 session and should stop parading themselves as such.
  3. That the election of the 2nd Respondent conducted by the Class Rep is null and Void and does not hold water
  4. That the LSRC, 8th respondents lack the constitutional power to ratify members of the BOJ and should stop performing such function.
  5. That the 7th respondent is hereby mandated to guide the class committee for BOJ election in conducting the election into the BOJ positions across all levels.
  6. That the Election of the BOJ should be conducted without delay

APPEARANCES:

Counsel for the Applicant:

  1. A. AKINSULURE
  2. U. AJAYI
  3. A. AKINOLA
  4. F. AJAYI

Counsel for the 1st Respondent:

  1. I. AKEREDOLU
  2. E. OGUNFEYIMI
  3. I. AJIBOLA
  4. O. ITANRIN
  5. A. OLUKAYODE
  6. E. ADEGUNSOYE
  7. E. ENIMOLA

Leave A Comment

All fields marked with an asterisk (*) are required